Players must make choices simultaneously, but under strategic uncertainty
Possible strategic choices and payoffs of each outcome to each player are known by all players
Must think not only about own best strategic choice, but also the best strategic choice of other player(s)


Normal or strategic form
By convention Row Player is Player 1, Column player is Player 2
Dimensions of matrix
For now, we only look at discrete strategies (and a single decision per player)

Again, in a Nash equilibrium, no player wants to change strategies given the strategies played by all other players
Today we will learn several methods to search for Nash equilibria in simultaneous games

Consider again the prisoners' dilemma
Consider each outcome and ask, does any player want to change strategies, given what the other player is doing?

Consider again the prisoners' dilemma
Consider each outcome and ask, does any player want to change strategies, given what the other player is doing?
If no player wants to switch strategies (given the others’), that outcome is a Nash equilibrium: (D, D)




Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 1 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire row from the game

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 1 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire row from the game


Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 2 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire column from the game

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 2 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire column from the game

Take the prisoners’ dilemma
Nash Equilibrium: (Defect, Defect)
Why can’t they both cooperate?

Main feature of prisoners’ dilemma: the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inferior to another outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate)!
How can we ever get rational cooperation?

Congress determines fiscal policy
Can tax & spend to Balance Budget
Can tax & spend to run a Budget Deficit
Constant political pressure to spend more & tax less

Federal Reserve determines monetary policy
Can target Low Interest Rates
Can target High Interest Rates
Generally wants to avoid inflation

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?


What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Hint: Do any of Column's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Hint: Do any of Column's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?


Keep searching for dominated strategies...
For Row, Left dominates both Up and Right

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Since Row will play Left, Column's best response is to play Middle

We've found the Nash Equilibrium: (Left, Middle)
Check that it's truly an equilibrium




What about ties?
For Row, A is “weakly” dominated by B

What about ties?
Same for Column: A is “weakly” dominated by B

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)
But (A, B) and (B, A) are also Nash equilibria!
So we can only rule out strictly dominated strategies!











Highlighted all best responses for each player, shows us the Nash Equilibrium: (Left, Middle)
In a Nash equilibrium, all players are playing a best response to each other's strategies
A more tedious process, but foolproof

For Row in this game:
Symmetrically for Column
Finds all three Nash equilibria (in each, both players play a best response)



Let's first try solving by searching for dominated strategies...
Game Show is dominated by Sitcom for ABC, so delete it


Keep searching
Sitcom is dominated by Game Show for NBC, so delete it


Keep searching
Sitcom is dominated by Game Show for CBS, so delete it



Nash Equilibrium: (Game Show, Game Show, Sitcom)
Now let's try using best response analysis instead
















Ranked from (most to least) effective and (most to least) tedious:
Cell-by-cell inspection
Best response analysis
Successive elimination of dominated strategies
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Players must make choices simultaneously, but under strategic uncertainty
Possible strategic choices and payoffs of each outcome to each player are known by all players
Must think not only about own best strategic choice, but also the best strategic choice of other player(s)


Normal or strategic form
By convention Row Player is Player 1, Column player is Player 2
Dimensions of matrix
For now, we only look at discrete strategies (and a single decision per player)

Again, in a Nash equilibrium, no player wants to change strategies given the strategies played by all other players
Today we will learn several methods to search for Nash equilibria in simultaneous games

Consider again the prisoners' dilemma
Consider each outcome and ask, does any player want to change strategies, given what the other player is doing?

Consider again the prisoners' dilemma
Consider each outcome and ask, does any player want to change strategies, given what the other player is doing?
If no player wants to switch strategies (given the others’), that outcome is a Nash equilibrium: (D, D)




Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1...

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 1 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire row from the game

Consider the prisoners' dilemma
For Player 1: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 1 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire row from the game


Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2...

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 2 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire column from the game

Alternatively, we could consider Player 2
For Player 2: Cooperate is dominated by Defect
Knowing Player 2 will never play Cooperate, we can delete that entire column from the game

Take the prisoners’ dilemma
Nash Equilibrium: (Defect, Defect)
Why can’t they both cooperate?

Main feature of prisoners’ dilemma: the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inferior to another outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate)!
How can we ever get rational cooperation?

Congress determines fiscal policy
Can tax & spend to Balance Budget
Can tax & spend to run a Budget Deficit
Constant political pressure to spend more & tax less

Federal Reserve determines monetary policy
Can target Low Interest Rates
Can target High Interest Rates
Generally wants to avoid inflation

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?

Both players choose policy simultaneously and independently of each other
How to find the equilibrium of this game?


What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

What about the following game?
Hint: Do any of Row's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Hint: Do any of Column's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Hint: Do any of Column's strategies always yield a lower payoff than another strategy?


Keep searching for dominated strategies...
For Row, Left dominates both Up and Right

Keep searching for dominated strategies...
Since Row will play Left, Column's best response is to play Middle

We've found the Nash Equilibrium: (Left, Middle)
Check that it's truly an equilibrium




What about ties?
For Row, A is “weakly” dominated by B

What about ties?
Same for Column: A is “weakly” dominated by B

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)

Successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies deleting A for both players
Predicted Nash Equilibrium: (B, B)
But (A, B) and (B, A) are also Nash equilibria!
So we can only rule out strictly dominated strategies!











Highlighted all best responses for each player, shows us the Nash Equilibrium: (Left, Middle)
In a Nash equilibrium, all players are playing a best response to each other's strategies
A more tedious process, but foolproof

For Row in this game:
Symmetrically for Column
Finds all three Nash equilibria (in each, both players play a best response)



Let's first try solving by searching for dominated strategies...
Game Show is dominated by Sitcom for ABC, so delete it


Keep searching
Sitcom is dominated by Game Show for NBC, so delete it


Keep searching
Sitcom is dominated by Game Show for CBS, so delete it



Nash Equilibrium: (Game Show, Game Show, Sitcom)
Now let's try using best response analysis instead
















Ranked from (most to least) effective and (most to least) tedious:
Cell-by-cell inspection
Best response analysis
Successive elimination of dominated strategies