Wednesday November 19, 2021.
Overview
Today we discuss several examples of the credible commitment problem in political economy.
Readings
- Chs. 9 in Dixit, Skeath, and Riley (textbook)
- Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994), “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild”
- Weingast (1995), “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”
- Fearon (1995), “Rationalist Explanations for War”
- Allison (2015), “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”, The Atlantic
Slides
Below, you can find the slides in two formats. Clicking the image will bring you to the html version of the slides in a new tab. Note while in going through the slides, you can type h to see a special list of viewing options, and type o for an outline view of all the slides.
The lower button will allow you to download a PDF version of the slides. I suggest printing the slides beforehand and using them to take additional notes in class (not everything is in the slides)!
